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ABSTRACT
The Navy Personnel Command assigns over lOO,OOO Sailors annually utilizing in
excess of 200 Detailers. This process is typically done manually between Sailor and
Detailer. Navy Personnel Research Studies and Technology (NPRST), together with
NPS, have begun a series of studies to optimize this process through the use of an Agent-
Based Employment Market System. To assist in the validation of the Agent-Based
System, this thesis seeks to design a simulation program as a demonstration of the
possibilities and potential advantages of an Agent-Based Electronic Employment Market.
Research includes conducting a review of the current personnel detailing process in the
Navy, coding a simulation program, and running various detailing scenarios. The
simulation results indicated there are potential advantages of an Agent-Based
Employment Market System to detailing in the Navy.
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In 1999, in conjunction with the Secretary of the Navy's Revolution in Business
Affairs initiative, the Recruiting, Retention, Training and Assignment working group
recommended that the Navy's enlisted distribution and assignment processes be
reengineered. CNP directed establishing a Distribution Reengineering Action Team,
chaired by PERS-4. During five two-week sessions in 1999, the team reviewed the
existing (As Is) process and identified opportunity areas where near term/low cost
improvements could be made. These improvements included eliminating the Enlisted
Navy Career Options for Reenlistment (ENCORE) program, establishing the Guaranteed
Assignment Retention Detailing (GUARD) 2000 program, enhancing enlisted placement
and eliminating duplicitous and conflicting policies. Remaining recommendations were
deferred for inclusion in the future process or determined to be beyond existing process
capabilities. The team next developed concepts for the future distribution process. The
goals for the process were to work toward a user-friendly process that would provide
enhanced quality of life for sailors and significantly improve force readiness, using
advanced, deliberation-capable intelligent software agents operating in a web based
"market place" environment, representing the full interests of our sailors and Navy
commands.
The future concepts included a sailor Production process (seeing the prospective
recruit from recruiting station to first "full duty" assignment); better defined career paths
(establishing reasonable career expectations, an apprentice/journeyman/master approach
and potential pay banding); vacancy driven distribution based on deployment cycles;
customer focused (both sailor/Command through the use of intelligent software agents);
and a credit or point system (coupled with scalable incentives) that rewards those sailors
who take the more arduous assignments and perform well.
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Keys to the success of a new process lie in the Navy/ Marine Corps Intranet,
continued research and development involving both deliberation-capable intelligent
software agents (ongoing at University of Memphis) and a web-based "marketplace"
environment (work being done by Naval Post Graduate School), and developing a sound
change management plan. Navy Personnel Research Studies and Technology (NPRST),
together with NPS, have begun a series of studies into the web-based "marketplace"
environment, comprising study of the current system through both Activity Based
Costing and stakeholders/process analysis and an initial development of matching
algorithms for an Intelligent Agent-Based Detailing Process.
The interest of this thesis is to assist in validating the Intelligent Agent-Based
Electronic Employment Market through simulations. A simulation software called
Agent-Based Employment Market Simulator (ABEMS) was written using Excel Basic.
ABEMS was programmed to allow the researchers to generate random profile datasets of
sailors and requisition billets according to user-specified discrete distributions. ABEMS
then matches the sailors to billets using the 2-sided matching algorithm. Various
scenarios were explored using ABEMS, including varying the intervals between
matching, and varying the length of the preference lists for the individual sailors and
commands. Using a two-week interval with preference length of 5, we could emulate the
"perfect" human detailer in assigning sailors to billets using ABEMS under the current
detailing process to a certain degree. However, it is likely that actual human detailers
may not be able to consistently match the quality and quantity ofmatching from ABEMS
due to human errors and fatigue (especially in longer intervals with larger data pools). A
related thesis study titled "Designing Economics Experiments to Demonstrate the
Advantages of an Electronic Employment Market in a Large Military Organization" by
MAl Tan and MAl Yeong covers the human experiments in detail (Reference No 3).
To ensure ABEMS will take into consideration the concerns and considerations of
the sailors and commands, a study was done on the current detailing process. Measures
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of fit were detennined between the sailors and the organization. Common modes of
matching people with jobs were also analyzed for their potential benefits and possible
areas of applicability to the Agent-Based System. Due to the unique nature and
restrictions of a military organization, it was often found that we need to customize these
modes of matching to our needs, and this presented both interesting and challenging
prospects to this thesis. We also drew on economic models to predict the actions and
choices of both the sailors and the organization, assuming that the parties will always
choose to maximize their own benefits, thereby fonning the 2-sided matching logic of
ABEMS. The individual sailors and commands are modeled using the Cobb Douglas
utility function, each with their own unique set of characteristics and preferences.
B. PURPOSE
This thesis will primarily deal with designing and programming a simulation
software and using the software to run various scenarios to demonstrate the potential
benefits of an Agent-Based Employment Market System.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary Research Question
How will an agent-based simulation model demonstrate the advantages of an
electronic employment market?
2. Subsidiary Research Questions
How does the personnel detailing process work in the USN? What are the
primary limitations of this process, and how do these limitations affect job assignments?
How can an agent-based electronic market help optimize job matching?
What simulation models are suitable for demonstrating the potential advantages of
an agent-based employment market in a military environment?
How long are the ideal intervals between matching? How will preference lengths
affect the outcome on the quality and quantity of matches made?
What are the potential benefits of implementing such a program?
Are there potential benefits from having a longer period between matching than
the current 2 week process? If so, what are the required conditions?
D. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
The scope of the study includes:
• Review the Navy's job assignment process,
• Study the limitations, if any, for the current job assignment process,
• Conceptualize the framework for the simulation model,
• Design and program a suitable simulation software (ABEMS),
• Investigate matching scenarios,
• Analyze the simulation results from the scenarios to determine important
variables that affect the quality and quantity ofmatching, and
• Identify potential benefits from using an Agent-Based Market System, and
• Recommend enhancements to the model.
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A systemic methodology is adopted for this thesis research, comprising a
literature search of books, magazine articles, CD-ROM systems, and other library
information resources for related information, review of the current job matching
practices in the civilian market, and augmenting our understanding of the current USN's
job assignment/detailing process.
This is followed by identifying and prioritizing the limitations of the current
USN's job assignment/detailing process, reviewing the information technology available
now and in the foreseeable future that will facilitate implementing such a system,
developing the process required for the simulation model, preparing a target proposal for
the simulation model, preparing modules network diagrams, developing a programming
code for the model, identifying the parameters to be used for preliminary model testing
and conducting beta testing.
The finalized simulation program is then used under various scenarios to
investigate the effects of having different variables such as longer intervals between
matching and longer preference lengths. The results are tabulated and charted to identify
possible benefits in quality and quantity of matching of an Agent-Based Employment
Market System, and the conditions for such benefits to be feasible.
E. EXPECTED BENEFITS OF THE STUDY
This thesis is part of the overall framework of studies concerned with
revolutionizing the detailing process from the present manual system to an Agent-Based
Employment Market System. It will provide validation to the Agent-Based System by
allowing us to run scenarios through ABEMS. Comparing the benefits and limitations
from the simulations will provide us with a better understanding of the potential benefits
of an Agent-Based System.
5
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II. BACKGROUND - OVERVIEW OF THE EMPLOYMENT MARKETS
A. LABOR MARKET ECONOMICS
Market-based approaches to employee/employer matching rely on the interaction
of labor demand and supply, and what is now textbook understanding of labor market
economics (Ehrenberg and Smith 1997). On the demand side of the labor market are
employers; while on the supply side of the market are workers and potential workers.
The forces of demand and supply heavily influence the wage that prevails in a particular
labor market.
The demand curve is typically downward sloping. Firms typically combine
various factors of production - mainly capital and labor - to produce goods or services
that are sold in a product market. Their total output and the combination of capital and
labor depend on three forces - product demand, the amount of labor and capital they can
acquire at given prices, and the choice of technologies available to them. When the wage
is high, it is likely that the potential return per dollar invested in capital is higher than
labor. The firm will continue to invest more in capital than labor until the equilibrium in
return per dollar invested is reached. Thus at one end, high wages typically correspond to
lower labor demand. On the other hand, should the wage be cheaper, the potential return
per dollar invested in labor will yield higher return than capital. The logical firm will
then invest more in labor, and less in capital. Thus lower wages will usually result in
higher demand for labor. The market demand curve indicates how many workers the firm
will be willing to hire at each wage level, holding all other variables (such as capital
costs) constant. 1
1 It is important to distinguish between a shift in a demand curve and movement along a curve. When the
wage changes and other forces are held constant, one moves along the curve. However, when one of the
other forces changes, the labor demand curve shifts. For example, if the cost of capital decreases, the
substitution effect will cause the labor demand curve to shift left, i.e. overall lowered demand for labor at
any given wage rate. On the other hand, lower capital costs could also result in lower product pricing,
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The labor supply curve is usually upward sloping. If the wages in the other
occupations are held constant, and the wages in our study market rise, we expect more
people to be willing to enter this market as their opportunity costs of not joining this
market becomes higher due to the relative improvement in compensation. Therefore,
when the wages are low, we expect to see a low labor supply (these are the enthusiastic
people who really enjoy working in this particular environment), while high wages will
usually result in a high labor supply (these are the people attracted to join the market due
to better compensation relative to their other choices). The market supply curve indicates
how many workers would enter the market at each wage level, holding the wages in other
occupations constant.
The point where the labor demand and supply curve intersect is known as the
market-clearing wage or market equilibrium wage. Figure 1 illustrates labor demand and
supply curves for a representative labor market. The wage rate in this market tends
towards its equilibrium value denoted by W*. The quantity of labor that employers are
willing to hire at this wage rate exactly equals the quantity of labor that employees
willingly supply (L*). Anyone that wants to work in the industry can find sufficient work
and any finn that wants to hire employees can find adequate employees.
thereby leading to higher demand. This scaling effect could potentially shift the labor demand curve right,
i.e. higher demand for labor at any given wage point. How the demand curve shifts will depend on the










Figure 1: Market-Based Labor Markets (From: Gates and Nissen, 2001)
If the wage rate is below the equilibrium W*, the quantity of labor demanded will
exceed the quantity supplied. At this point, employers will be competing for the few
workers in the market and a shortage of workers will exist. The desire of the firms to
attract more employees would lead them to increase their wage offers, thus driving up the
overall level of wage offers in the market (upward pressure on wage rate towards W*).
As the wage rises, two things will happen. First, more workers will choose to
enter the market and look for jobs (a movement upwards to the right along the supply
curve), and second, increasing wages would induce employers to seek fewer workers
(movement upwards to the left along the demand curve). If wages rise over W*, the
quantity of labor supplied will exceed the quantity demanded. Employers will desire
fewer workers than the numbers available. This will result in excess in supply.
Employers soon realize that they can fill their positions with lower wages as eager
applicants look for jobs. Some will be happy to accept the jobs at the lower wage points,
while others will leave the market (thereby movement downwards along the supply
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curve). Again, the forces of the market will tend to drive the wage towards the
equilibrium wage W*.
A subtle but important aspect of equilibrium wage rates involves job amenities,
such as work environment, geographic location, commute, promotion potential, work
content/challenge, job satisfaction, etc. In weighing employment benefits in one industry
relative to alternative time uses (leisure and other jobs), job amenities are important
considerations. If job amenities are particularly attractive in one industry, individuals
will supply labor to that industry at relatively low wage rates; if job amenities are
unpleasant, labor is only supplied at relatively high wage rates (Ehrenberg and Smith
1997). This is referred to as compensating wage differentials. For example, an engineer
is likely to be paid more if he is required to perform arduous field work in third world
countries versus his counterpart with the same qualifications in a comfortable office close
to home. Holding other characteristics constant, individuals willing to work in an
industry for relatively low wages either derive high utility from agreeable job amenities
(e.g. flexible hours for a home care provider with children), or are relatively weakly
deterred by objectionable job amenities (e.g. a fit young adventurous employee working
as a forest ranger).
Market-based labor markets balance demand and supply, ensuring equality
between the quantities of labor demanded and supplied. To operate efficiently,
employees must have complete information about relevant job characteristics and
opportunities, including salary, benefits and job amenities. To mimic the results of
market-based labor markets, alternative labor market mechanisms must both balance
demand and supply, and promote demand and supply efficiencies. To ensure demand and
supply efficiency, labor assignments must reflect labor's relative value in alternative uses,
employee capabilities and job preferences.
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With regards to labor assignments, there are currently two modes prevailing in the
matching people with jobs: 1) hierarchical planning and 2) distributed markets. Each has
strengths and limitations, which will be discussed in the following sections.
1. Hierarchical Labor Market
Hierarchical labor markets assign individuals to jobs using a centralized process.
Such assignments rely on administrative procedures to match individual capabilities and
job requirements and to reflect both the job's relative priority and the individual's job
preferences. There is no mechanism to automatically strike a balance between supply and
demand efficiencies, as in market-based labor markets. At one extreme, employers can
assign individuals to jobs with little regard to personal preferences. Employees can either
accept the assignment or find another alternative occupation. This approach emphasizes
the employer's performance (demand efficiency) at the expense of employee morale
(supply efficiency). At the other extreme, employers can emphasize individual job
preferences relative to job priority and the match between employee skills and job
requirements. This emphasizes employee morale at the expense of employer
performance. Criticisms against hierarchical labor markets concern their inability to
ensure demand and supply efficiencies, inherent equilibrium conditions in market-based
labor markets. This inability reflects both information requirements and asymmetric
incentives (profits vs. morale).
Demand and supply efficiencies are particularly important for closed systems with
a constrained labor supply. In the military, wages are uniform across jobs requiring
similar skills and experience (no compensating wages). As a result, the cost of assigning
labor to one use is the loss of output in the best alternative unfilled use for that labor
(opportunity cost); salaries and benefits are irrelevant in measuring labor costs. If labor
assignments don't maximize demand and supply efficiencies, the system wastes resources
by applying them to less valuable jobs, and reduces job satisfaction, morale and retention,
11
by assigning labor to jobs that are relatively less desirable with no compensating wage
differential.
The Department of Navy (DoN) uses a centralized, hierarchical labor market to
match enlisted sailors to jobs. On the demand side, Navy commands identify open
positions. Job vacancies are compared to projections of available personnel. Typically,
the number of positions to be filled exceeds the supply of available personnel. Therefore,
the Navy develops a Navy Manning Plan (NMP) that spreads the labor shortage across all
commands, on a "fair-share" basis. The Navy then prioritizes job vacancies based on
each command's mission, current staffing levels, and several other relevant
characteristics. This process attempts to distinguish between high and low valued
demands for labor, to mimic demand efficiency in market-based economy.
On the supply side, available personnel are categorized according to their
qualifications (ratings), including skills, experience, education/training, career path, etc.
Similar skill groups are arranged in communities (e.g. electronics, supply, machinists).
Each community has a detailer charged with matching personnel to jobs. Sailors seeking
job assignments can express their personal preferences to the detailer. The detailer is
responsive to job vacancy priority ratings, but there is some room for discretion in
tailoring job assignments to meet the sailors' personal preferences (supply efficiency).
Supply efficiency is subordinate to demand efficiency in this process.
DoN's hierarchical labor market is further complicated because enlisted sailors
change jobs every two to three years. Thus, the centralized detailing process reassigns
between one third and one half and one half of the enlisted force every year. This adds a
time dimension to this process that is more critical than in typical civilian markets. The
Navy begins identifying job vacancies and available personnel as early as nine months in
advance. Time also affects the job vacancy priority rating. More imminent vacancies
receive a higher priority than similar but more distant vacancies.
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DoN fills billets (i.e. jobs) according to a predetermined priority ranking until the
labor supply is exhausted, and demand efficiency is emphasized over supply efficiency.
In market-based labor markets, equilibrium wage rates automatically performs functions;
wages adjust until there is no excess supply or demand for labor, and employees
voluntarily choose their preferred job, considering both relative wages (compensating
wage rates) and job amenities. In DoN's hierarchical labor market, wage rates do not
increase to limit the demand for labor to the available supply, so commanders are
frustrated they can't fill vacant positions. Similarly, wages do not adjust across job
assignments to account for job amenities, and assignments do not fully incorporate the
sailor's job preferences. Predictably, both commanders and enlisted sailors voice
dissatisfaction with the current hierarchical labor market.
2. Distributed Markets: Two-Sided Matching Markets
The market-based approach supports unrestricted, point-to-point matching
between potential employees and outside employers. In this scenario, the potential for
problematic information overload can be high, and employee turnover incessant.
Unlike fast-paced IT firms in Silicon Valley, wage rates for military personnel are
set by fiat and adjust very slowly to supply- or demand-driven pressures. At least in the
short term, DoN cannot rely on spot labor markets for filling its key jobs with qualified
people. Indeed, without its current, hierarchical detailing system, the Navy would find it
very difficult to fill many of its important jobs. Yet the Navy could also benefit from the
efficiencies associated with market-based systems. A two-sided matching market assigns
individuals to jobs when there are several possible employers and employees. The
matching algorithm balances the employers' and employees' preferences, but it can
produce assignments that give priority to either employers or employees. As such, the
algorithm specifically addresses both demand and supply efficiency. Unlike hierarchical
systems, matching markets balance both employers' and employees' preferences. This
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effectively matches job requirements and employee capabilities, and systematically helps
obviate many supply side problems, including employee dissatisfaction, low morale and
retention. This improves both demand and supply efficiency relative to hierarchical labor
markets.
Two-sided matching markets also are responsive enough to keep pace with the
extreme periodic job rotations effected routinely by the Navy. But such matching
markets lack the automatic dynamic response of market-based systems, and the
opportunity for side agreements that circumvent the system can be administratively
cumbersome. Unlike market-based systems, two sided matching markets provide some
centralized control through the clearinghouse, and periodic matching can dampen the
high rates of employee turnover now experienced in high technology industries.
The balance between demand and supply preferences depend on the matching
algorithm. It is important that the matching process recognize job priorities, a function
performed by detailers in DoN's hierarchical process.
In our thesis, our focus will primarily be on designing a suitable simulation model
that can demonstrate the differences between current systems and agent based two-sided
matching systems. These results would be used for analysis and evaluation of the
potential benefits and limitations of the applicability of using two-sided matching in the
DoN.
14
B. OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT NAVY ENLISTED DETAILING
PROCESS
1. Organization Structure
The Navy's Manpower, Personnel, and Training processes include Manpower
Requirements, ManpO\ver Programming, Personnel Planning and Personnel Distribution.
This thesis will concentrate on the Personnel Distribution process, specifically the
Enlisted Distribution System (EDS). The EDS consists of a distribution triad: allocation,










Figure 2: Manpower, Personnel, & Training PowerPoint Brief (From CDR Bill Hatch, 16 May 2000)
The overall distribution goal is to ensure what is commonly referred to as the
"four rights" or "R4:" the right Sailor "With the right training occupying the right billet at
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the right time. The focus in this thesis win be on the assignment process v.'ithin the
distribution triad, which is commonly called "detailing," for active duty enlisted Sailors.
The allocation process initially separates distributable and non-distributable
personnel inventory. Distributable inventory includes everyone who is not a student or in
a Transient, Patient, Prisoner, or Holdee (TPPH) status. Students also referred to as
Awaiting Instruction (AI) and TPPH personnel are non-distributable and are included in












Figure 3: Manpower, Personnel, & Training PowerPoint Brief (From CDR Bill Hatch, 16 May 2000)
Distributable
Inventory
The four Manning Control Authorities (MCAs) are then apportioned distributable
inventory in accordance 'With Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) priorities. The four
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MCAs include Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CPF); Commander in Chief,
U.S. Atlantic Fleet (CLF); Commander, Navy Personnel Command (CNPC); and
Commander, Naval Reserve Forces (CNRF). The CNO and MCAs establish priority
manning for distributable inventory. Allocation, placement, and assignment of
distributable inventory are depicted in Figure 4 below. Each level of distribution is
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Figure 4: Manpower, Personnel, & Training PowerPoint Brief (From CDR Bill Hatch, 16 May 2000)
From Figure 4 above, the three distribution levels for distributable inventory are
clear. The allocation process apportions distributable inventory to the four MCAs based
on CNO priorities. Then, the placement process ensures that command needs are
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addressed. Finally, the assignment process considers the Sailors' preferences. These
processes are further explained.
CNPC is involved with the allocation process. It is organized into different
branches or departments, commonly referred to as Personnel or "Pers" codes. The
Distribution Management, Allocation, Resources and Procedures Department (Pers 45) is
responsible for allocation supervision and ensures a prioritized balance of distributable
personnel to both sea and shore activities. Pers 45 personnel use the Enlisted
Distributable Projections System (EDPROJ), a computer program which measures
current strength against current billets for statistical purposes, and measures the projected
strength nine months in the future against the projected billet time frame. EDPROJ
receives data from two information systems, the Total Force Manpower Management
System (TFFMS) and the Enlisted Master File (EMF), to determine where available
personnel should be assigned to ensure equitable allocation among CNO priorities and
the four MCAs.
Pers 45 uses EDPROJ to measure current strength versus current billets and
projected strength versus projected billets in the next nine months. The CNO determines
CNO priority manning (Pri 1/2), which is transferred to EDPROJ to ensure that these
priorities are accounted for before any other allocations are made. This resulting
information is transferred from Pers 45 to the Enlisted Placement Management Center
(EPMAC). (Hatch, 2000).
EPMAC uses the projected personnel from EDPROJ, coupled with MCA's
prioritization manning algorithms and billet information from TFMMS to establish Navy
Manning Planning (NMP) levels. NMP equitably distributes the projected personnel by
rate (i.e. E3, E6, E9); rating (i.e. ABF, PN, EN); and Navy Enlisted Classification (NEC)
code across all activities to ensure each command receives its "fair share" of distributable
personnel. Distributing the projected enlisted inventory equitably across the four MCAs,
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EPMAC's goal as the command advocate is to ensure the right person with the proper
occupational skills occupies the right billet on time.
The MCAs communicate with EPMAC to ensure that activities have the
personnel they need to accomplish their missions. Depending on the command's
operational schedule, special circumstances, or additional considerations, MCAs can
adjust requisition priorities to meet individual command personnel needs. When
activities need to increase manning above their NMP level for specific mission
accomplishment, MCAs may designate Priority 3 requisitions within their areas of
responsibility. Priority 3 requisitions are valid for up to one year, and they are
automatically cancelled on 30 September, unless another specific date is authorized.
Designating a requisition as Priority 3 indicates that the billet has a higher priority than
other requisitions, but Priority 3 requisitions are not as high priority as the CNO Priority
1 and 2 requisitions. Requisition priorities are an important consideration during the
assignment process. During the assignment process, Sailors are selected and assigned,
commonly called "detailing," into high priority billets based on NMP. In other words,
the assignment process matches "faces" with "spaces." "Faces" result from scheduled
rotation or availability whereas "spaces" occur when the command has fewer projected
assigned personnel than the NMP, producing a "requisition."
Requisitions are generated in the Enlisted Personnel Requisition System (EPRES)
information system when a command's projected manning in a particular rating (skill)
and rate (pay grade) falls below the projected NMP levels. The requisitions are then
downloaded into the computer-based Enlisted Assignment Information System (EAIS),
where the assignment officer, referred to as the detailer, can review them. Requisitions
appear in priority order with the number one requisition being the highest priority billet to
fill. CNO Priority 1 and 2 requisitions will appear at the top of the list immediately
followed by the MCA Priority 3 requisitions.
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The detailer represents the Sailors, or faces, in the Enlisted Distribution System.
The detailer's goal is to cost effectively match Sailors with the necessary skill sets to the
prioritized requisitions. Detailers employ EAIS to accomplish their difficult task of
assigning available personnel to priority requisitions. Detailers view distributable
inventory Sailors in EAIS nine months before completing their current tour of duty, i.e.,
their Projected Rotation Date (PRD). Non-distributable Sailors in the IA (students and
TPPH) also appear in EAIS nine months prior to their PRD.
Once detailers have selected a Sailor for a particular requisition, they access the
Orders Writing Screen (OM) to begin the order writing process. Once orders are
electronically assigned, before actual orders are written, EPMAC reviews those orders for
personnel E6 and above for quality of fit. EPMAC has the authority to veto preliminary
assignments between detailers and petty officers first class and above. This ensures that
the detailers' assignment best matches Sailors to jobs. EPMAC placement specialists can
veto orders that fail to meet fleet readiness manning and balance, even if the orders are
exactly what the E6 or above Sailor requested. EPMAC provides a sanity check on
orders to ensure the fleet receives the Sailor it needs. Once approved by EPMAC, if
applicable, the Sailor receives written orders. Essentially, the allocation, placement, and
assignment processes work in concert to meet the Navy's readiness priorities.
2. Navy Assignment From A Micro Perspective
The Navy's centralized system to reassign personnel among different duty types
has two objectives. First, the assignment system must optimize readiness and stability
for both afloat and ashore activities. Secondly, the assignment system must provide equal
opportunity for personnel to serve in their desired duty. In theory, the task appears rather
simple; in practice, balancing the Navy's needs with the Sailor's desires involves
complex, time-consuming tradeoffs often requiring the Sailor to either accommodate or
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acquiesce one or more facets of their desired job assignment. Sailors may have to accept
a different type duty, location, billet, or ship than they originally preferred.
Detailers rely on myriad information systems as well as personal rating
knowledge to direct personnel into prioritized, available billets. EAIS, which displays
requisitions by priority, is their primary information system. Ifpersonnel require training
en route to their new command, detailers use the Navy Training Reservation System
(NTRS) database to obtain class quotas and ensure requisite training is accomplished.
(Hatch, 2000)
Currently, there is no single tool to help the detailers "mentally juggle" diverse
policies, procedures, and information to ensure that the right Sailor with the necessary
occupational skills is assigned to the right job on time. Detailer decisions, primarily
subjective, may not always result in the best match for the Navy and/or the Sailor.
Detailers must consider numerous, often changing, policies and procedures promulgated
by the DoD, CNG, MCA, and CNPC when matching personnel to billets. (Hatch,2000)
Furthermore, Sailors have their own unique preferences, goals, and personal needs that
detailers must consider. Detailers continually struggle to manage the Navy's
requirements and the Sailor's wishes.
The detailer's primary consideration is whether the Sailor possesses the
occupational skill set the billet requires. This consideration must be balanced with the
detailer's next concern: conserving Permanent Change of Station (PCS), or transfer,
funds. Detailers must minimize monetary expenditures yet maximize the effective use of
personnel abilities and qualifications. To assist with this tasking, detailers can review
Sailor's qualifications in EAIS. EAIS will give the detailers pertinent information for
reassignment decisions such as number of dependents, NECs, End of Active Obligated
Service (EAOS) date, Projected Rotation Date (PRD), current duty station and
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assignment history or Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) scores, which are used to
determine reassignments.
Detailers also take into account spreadsheets containing the average PCS
expenditures based on the Sailor's pay grade, location, and number of dependents.
Detailers tenaciously match Sailors to jobs to the best of their ability. Their job is made
more difficult because EAIS is only about 80 percent correct in characterizing service
members' skills and the average PCS expenditures are only updated biennially. (Short,
2000)
If the Sailor does not possess the billet's required skill level, detailers may
consider training alternatives. Depending on class quota availability and training
expenditure levels, the detailer can offer the constituent training en route. Using NTRS,
the detailer immediately reserves the Sailor's quota; ensuring required training is
accomplished prior to the member's arrival at the new command.
Detailers must also maintain fleet balance by ensuring that enlisted personnel are
equitably distributed to all activities among the MCAs by rate, rating, and NEC in
proportion to the Enlisted Master File (EMF) delineated by the NMP. The requisition's
priority require detailer's focus to ensure that priority-designated jobs are filled first and
that face-to-face turnover occurs whenever possible.
Acting as career counselors, detailers must advocate various duty assignments for
service members. Detailers must ensure that personnel have the opportunity for
advancement experience and rating excellence, and that they equitably share any existing
hardship duty. Other factors requiring the detailer's attention are the member's Projected
Rotation Date (PRD) and sea/shore rotation cycle. When considering personnel for
overseas assignments, detailers must also follow Congressional policy which states that
active duty members may not be assigned on land outside the United States or its
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territories and possessions, until they have had twelve weeks of basic training or its
equivalent. Therefore, detailers can assign new enlistees overseas only after their initial
basic training.
For personnel who have family members in primary or secondary school, detailers
attempt to schedule transfers during school breaks, to minimize school schedule
disruption as practicable. Additionally, military couples must be co-located if at all
possible. Gender is another factor requiring the detailer's careful attention; females must
be near adequate medical treatment facilities during pregnancy and females have fewer
potential duty assignments (e.g. no female billets are available on submarines or Navy
Sea, Air, Land (SEAL) units and certain ships are not configured for female Sailors).
Given these considerations, balancing the Sailor's desires with the Navy's
priorities requires the detailer's meticulous attention and genuine concern. Sailors'
personal concerns include such items as home ownership, spouses' careers, children's
stability, and location preference. Each is a valid concern that detailers should address.
Furthermore, an entire detailing division is dedicated to handling service members'
special assignments, such as Humanitarian Assignments (HUMS) or Exceptional Family
Member (EFM) personnel. Currently, approximately 294 enlisted detailers manage
nearly 330,000 Sailors' careers. (Cunningham, 2000)
To improve decision-making efficiency and effectiveness, the Job Advertising and
Selection System (lASS) was developed. JASS is an on-line information and decision
support system for Sailors, Command Career Counselors (CCCs), and detailers. At their
convenience, Sailors around the world view and apply for the posted prioritized billets.
Prior to JASS, Sailors had to negotiate with detailers via the telephone. This first-come,
first-serve process forced Sailors to make hasty decisions over the phone and compelled
detailers to assign personnel to billets when they were not the "best qualified" or least
costly move. Furthermore, Sailors assigned to ships, remote locations, or night shifts
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often did not have the opportunity to contact their detailers for jobs upon initial opening.
(Short, 2000) As a result, they often got "stuck" with less desirable billets. These Sailors
were frustrated by their disadvantaged position. In short, the Navy's priorities and
Sailor's desires were not optimized before lASS was introduced in 1995.
JASS permits Sailors to view jobs available in their pay grade and rating or Navy
Enlisted Classification (NEC) code. Inconvenient phone calls to the detailers and snap
decisions without family involvement are minimized. View-only JASS, available via
Bureau of Personnel (BUPERS) Access, allows Sailors to see, but not apply for, all
available jobs in the current requisition. Any service member, enlisted or officer, can use
view-only JASS to see the available jobs by rate, rating, and NEe. (Short, 2000) With
this initiative, Sailors can go on-line through the internet in the comfort of their homes or
workstations to explore available jobs. Sailors can see available positions, research
alternatives, and discuss options with family. Ultimately, this information system allows
Sailors to make informed, sagacious decisions regarding their next duty assignment. Only
Command Career Counselors, or those designated by their Commanding Officer as career
counselors, have the access to make job applications. Command Career Counselors are
involved for two reasons. First, they ensure that the Sailors are eligible and qualified for
the positions to which they are applying. Secondly, Command Career Counselors are
fully engaged in the advisory role for Sailors' careers. View-only lASS offers Sailors
flexibility and convenience.
Command Career Counselors aboard naval vessels use JASS Client. They
download bi-monthly data for the latest information cycle and jobs available. Using the
ship's Standard Automated Logistics Tool Set (SALTS) or International Maritime
Satellite (INMARSAT) communication capabilities, the CCC can download the most
recent JASS information, including the latest requisitions, via File Transfer Protocol
(FTP) program. The Command Career Counselor then works off-line with JASS Client,
assisting Sailors with their job applications. Before the end of the application cycle,
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usually five days, the Command Career Counselor uploads all Sailors' billet applications
for their detailers' review. Currently, WEB lASS is being introduced as an improved
tool for Command Career Counselors. (Short, 2000) This simplifies their access to lASS
information by allowing downloads and uploads directly from the Internet, to ships or
stations with Internet access.
Using lASS Client or WEB lASS, the Command Career Counselor helps Sailors
apply for up to five different jobs in preference order during a two-week requisition cycle.
Because Sailors only have approximately five days to submit applications to the detailer
before requisitions close, Sailors at sea, in remote locations, or working odd shifts have
the opportunity to apply for the same jobs to which shore Sailors conveniently apply. No
longer is the detailing process a first-come, first-serve assignment process. Detailing
involves batch processing, thereby leveling the playing field for all Sailors. (Short 2000;
Hatch, 2000)
When requisitions close, detailers spend approximately four days reviewing
constituents' desires and matching the best-qualified person to the available positions
based on the Navy's needs and the Sailor's desires and/or qualifications. Allowing batch-
process detailing, lASS ensures a greater probability of efficient, effective Sailor-to-job
pairing. Once a Sailor is assigned to an available position and new requisitions are
uploaded from NMP, the detailer releases new billets on lASS, restarting the two-week
cycle.
One drawback to lASS is that Sailors expect to be assigned to their number one
billet application, even though they apply for up to five different jobs. Frequently Sailors
are not selected for their most preferred job, so detailers receive numerous phone calls or
emails from disgruntled constituents requesting explanations and/or recommendations.
(Short, 2000) At the beginning of every two-week requisition cycle, the detailers can
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expect to answer these phone calls or emails. Detailers can give Sailors career advice on
steps to make them more marketable for their desired positions.
Despite some disadvantages, lASS is generally advantageous for detailers as well.
Detailers have the highest level of lASS access. They can view jobs, apply for jobs, and
select Sailors to fill jobs. Since lASS in not compatible with EAIS, detailers must
laboriously hand-transfer information from lASS into EAIS, and vice versa. On the other
hand, lASS allows detailers to concentrate on actual assignments because it eliminates
initial phone calls requesting available billet information. In addition, detailers can now
select the "best qualified" Sailor for the job from several applicants rather than the first
person who is able to contact the detailer, benefiting both the Navy and the Sailor.
Helping detailers optimize the Navy's priorities and grant Sailor's desires, lASS is a step
toward connecting detailers, Command Career Counselors, and Sailors in this ever
increasingly automated world.
3. The Need For Alternative Approach
The Navy must ameliorate the cumbersome, random detailing process to create
incentives for junior and senior Sailors to remain in the Navy. In recent years, the
civilian unemployment rate has declined to four percent, a 30-year low. First-term Navy
attrition approached 40 percent in 1998-1999, the highest in history. (Moniz, 2000)
Considering the booming economy and the potentially disruptive military life, we must
take steps to ensure that people are not leaving the military in search of alternative
occupations. The Navy's centralized, labor-intensive detailing process often disappoints
its Navy customers, including both commands and Sailors. In addition, the detailing
process is such a significant factor in Sailors' careers, that it may potentially reduce
Sailor morale and retention. If left unchecked, a deficient detailing process could lead to
Sailors' substandard performance and poor fleet readiness. (Gates and Nissen, 2001)
Sailors today expect fast answers and quick explanations for why they were not selected
for the first-choice job or what their next career-enhancing move should be.
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The Navy-wide Personnel Survey found that approximately 78% of enlisted
Sailors have full-time employed spouses, a significant increase from previous years.
(Kantor 1997; Olmsted, 2000) In many instances, the spouse's career provides a larger
family income than the Sailor's career. Thus, the Navy must allow and, indeed,
encourage continued spousal employment by assisting Sailors to accommodate their
spouse's career. Otherwise, assignment may have a direct bearing on whether Sailors
decide to continue their Navy career. (McGrath,2000)
A common complaint among Sailors using lASS is that their Command Career
Counselor is not readily available to assist them with career advice or job applications.
Very often Sailors resort to the former method of telephoning their detailer to get the
perceived "inside scoop." Furthermore, despite being able to view available jobs on
lASS, Sailors believe they will receive better or different job options by directly
contacting the detailer. (Short, 2000)
The Enlisted Distribution System may wish to examine lessons learned from the
Commander, Navy Recruiting Command (CNRC), which now employs online recruiting
to enlist new troops. CNRC is meeting Generation Y on their own turf, the Internet, and
the military's recruiting targets are being met. Vice Admiral Ryan, Chief of Naval
Personnel, recently commented that cyber-recruiting could be more effective than the old
method of stalking malls and high schools for enlistees. (Moniz, 2000) The detailing
process must follow suit and start offering job searches and selections via the Internet.
Although not problem free, lASS is an excellent first step, but needs to go further to
balance the Navy's needs and the Sailor's desires.
Two-sided matching labor markets offer the potential to address the concerns
experienced by the commanders and the sailors. This thesis will focus on first order
simulation models that would be used to demonstrate the potential benefits and
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limitations of applying agent-based two-sided matching to DoN's hierarchical labor
market. The models would fonn the foundation for enhancement to be made.
C. 2-SIDED MATCHING ALGORITHM
1. A Classical Algorithm For Stable Marriage
2-sided matching algorithm can be employed to achieve stable marriage matching
of sample size n. A stable matching is a complete matching of men and women such that
no man and woman who are not partners both prefer each other to their actual partners
under the matching. (Irving, Leather & Gusfield, 1987)
In an instance of the stable marriage problem, each n men and n women lists the
members of the opposite sex in order of preference. This classical algorithm nonnally
yields what is called the male optimal solution, with the property that every man has the
best partner that he can have in any stable marriage. If applied with the roles of men and
women interchanged, the algorithm will yield the female optimal solution, which
similarly favors the women. The achievement of best possible partners by the members
of one sex results in the members of the opposite sex having their worst possible partners.
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Figure 5: Male And Female Preference Lists
The classical algorithm for a solution to a stable marriage instance is based on a
sequence of "proposals" from the men to the women. Each man proposes, in order, to the
women on his preference list, pausing when a woman agrees to consider his proposal, but
continuing if a proposal is "either immediately or subsequently rejected. When a woman
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receives a proposal, she rejects it if she already holds a better proposal, but otherwise
agrees to hold it for consideration, simultaneously rejecting any poorer proposal that she
may currently hold. (A "better" proposal means a proposal from some man higher in the
woman's preference list.)
Hence after fIrst round, it can seen from the example in Fig 5, men [2] and [7]
would have received the rejection from the woman fIrst on their preference list. The
match [2,6] and [7,7] are considered unstable matches and shaded gray. Men [2] and [7]
will now propose to the women second on their preference list, highlighted in white. 3
scenarios can happen:
• Women accepts proposal, rejecting proposal they held earlier from
other men. The other man would have to "move on" and propose to the
woman of their second choice. The process of proposal is repeated again
for the rejected men.
• Women rejecting the proposal by men [2] & [7]. The unstable matches
would be shaded gray and the men moved on to propose to the women
next on their list.
• Women accepting the proposal, with no prior proposal from other
men. The process represents a stable match and nobody gets rejected.
The process is repeated until all matches are stable. In this example, the stable
match scenario occurs when men [2] & [7] proposed to their second choice women.
It can thus be shown that, the sequence of proposals will result in every woman
holding a unique proposal, and that the proposals held constitute a stable matching. (A
similar outcome results if the roles of males and females are reversed, in which case the
resulting stable matching mayor may not be the same as that obtained from the male
proposal sequence). Two fundamental implications of this initial proposal sequence are
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• If a man, m, proposes to woman, w, then there is no stable matching in
which m has a better partner than w;
• If w receives a proposal from m, then there is no stable matching in which
w has a worse partner than m.
These observations suggest that we should explicitly remove m from w's list, and
w from m's, if w receives a proposal from someone she likes better than m. These are
shaded in gray in the example in Fig.5 and the resulting list is called the shortlist (male-
oriented) for the given problem instance, with the following properties:
• If w does not appear on m's shortlist, then there is no stable matching in
which m and w are partners.
• w appears on m's shortlist if and only if m appears on w's, and is first on
m's shortlist if and only if m is last on w's.
• If every man is paired with the first woman on his shortlist, then the
resulting match is stable; it is called the male optimal solution, for no man
can have a better partner than he does in this matching, and indeed no
woman can have a worse one.
• If the roles of males and females are interchanged, and if every woman is
paired with the first man on her (female-oriented) shortlist, then the
resulting matching is stable; this would be a female optimal solution, for
no woman can have a better partner than she does in this matching, and
indeed no man can have a worse one.
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2. Relevance To This Thesis
This classical algorithm will be the matching algorithm used in coding the
simulation model for matching between the sailors and different command. As
demonstrated in the illustration above, it can be seen that the current system of
assignment can be mimicked by replacing the males with commands and females with
sailors becoming available for assignment. This will result in a command biased match,
reflecting the current detailing process where detailers tries to assign sailors to prioritized
jobs while trying to take into account the sailor's preferences. Our thesis will attempt to
demonstrate the potential difference in utilities between a sailor and command biased
match; the possibility of a minimum critical mass required for efficient matching to occur
while using an agent-based matching algorithm thus drawing implications it has on the
time frame required for detailing and assignment process.
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III. EMPIRICAL STUDY/ THE MODEL
A. INTRODUCTION
1. Overview of the Simulation Process
The simulation models will be coded and run in a Microsoft Excel environment.
In this thesis, the factors used for the simulation process are what the authors considered
to be fundamentally important to the detailing process. In our coding, we are acutely
aware that we have not exhaustively characterized the detailing process in the US Navy.
Thus, our model allows future additions/enhancements to the factors used for simulation.
The model will be primarily used to answer the following questions:
• How will an agent-based simulation model demonstrate the advantages of
an electronic employment market?
• How can an agent-based electronic market help optimize job matching?
• What are the potential benefits of implementing such a program?
• Is there a critical mass required for benefits to be derived from such a
matching process?
• Is there any impact on the time frame (2 weeks) used for the detailing and
assignment cycle in the current process?
• What is the effect of preference list lengths on the two-sided logic
matching algorithm?
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B. THE SIMULATION MODEL - AGENT-BASED EMPLOYMENT
MARKET SIMULATOR (ABEMS)
The Agent-based Employment Market Simulator, or ABEMS, is a simulation
software written using Excel Basic. It comprises two major components: 1) profile
generator, and 2) the preference generation and matching logic.
ABEMS will allow the user to generate their sample of sailors, priority
requisition billets and priority 2/3 requisition billets. After the profile generation, the user
can then activate the main simulation module to generate preference lists for both sailors
and commands. The agent then matches the sailors to billets according to the logic
chosen. The logic can be either sailor or command biased.
Figure 6: ABEMS Process
1. The Profile Generator
The profile generator requires the Excel analysis toolpak for it to work. If the
analysis toolpak is not listed in the Add-Ins dialog box, click Browse and locate the drive,
folder name and file name for the analysis toolpak add-in, Analys32.xll (usually located
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in the Microsoft Office\Office\Library\Analysis folder. Alternatively, the user may run
the Setup program to install the toolpak.
To use the profile generator, the user may enter the discrete distributions of the
characteristics of sailors, priority 1 and priority 2/3 billets in their respective worksheets,
namely SProfiler, PIProfiler and P2Profiler, respectively. The sum of each discrete
distribution for each characteristic must sum to 1. The random number generator is
activated by clicking Tools, and then Data Analysis. From the dialog box, select Random
Number Generation.
From the Random Number Generation dialog box, enter the number of random
numbers you want to generate (e.g. 2000), select the probability and input range from the
profile worksheet (e.g. for SR, select B4 to C8), and then select the output range by
clicking the first cell in the Sailor worksheet you want the profiler to start generating
from (e.g. for SR, select Sailor!$B$4). Click enter and the new profile for those
characteristics will be generated according to the specified discrete distributions. Repeat
the process for the rest of the characteristics. The process should be repeated for priority




PREFERRED PROMOTION BILLET SHORE
BILLET ID RATE TRNG LVL INDEX LOCATION BILLET
BI BR BTL BPI BL BS
1 :.! :.! 4 1 1
2 1 3 3 1 1
3 2 4 3 2 1
4 5 3 5 2 5
5 1 2 2 2 5
6 3 2 2 4 5
7 2 3 4 5 1
8 3 2 3 1 1
9 1 1 5 4 5
10 1 1 4 4 1
11 2 2 2 2 1
12 2 2 2 2 1
13 1 5 2 4 1
14 3 3 2 3 1
15 2 4 4 5 1
16 5 2 4 4 1
17 2 4 2 1 1
Figure 7: Snapshot of 17 Billets' Characteristics
The preference weights of the sailors and commands uses the Cobb Douglas
utility function (which will be described in detail in the following sections). They are
randomly generated by the profilers and copied to their respective database worksheet
when you click regenerate alphas/betas command button. Each sailor will have his/her
own unique characteristics, and his/her own weights to their billet preference, randomly
generated in the simulated environment. For example, the more ambitious sailors will
have a heavier weight placed on the promotion index weight of the job (a demanding high
profile billet is likely to boost the sailor's chance for promotion and career advancement
if the sailor excels in it), than if the job is a shore billet. Similarly, the billets themselves
have their individual characteristics. For example, some commands will be more
concerned on PCS costs due to budget constraints, while others will put more weight to
getting sailors of the correct training and experience.
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Figure 8: ABEMS Profile Generator
2. Preference Generation and Matching Logic
ABEMS will activate the simulator specifications dialog box when you click the
start simulation command button on the main worksheet. The dialog box will allow you
to specify various parameters for the simulation, including number of sailors to be
matched, number of priority 1 requisition billets, number of priority 2/3 requisition
billets, and the preference length list.
You may choose to run through the simulation process step by step, or simply
click the auto sailor biased logic or the auto command biased logic command button to
run the whole simulation process (the preference lists generation logic and the
sailor/command biased matching logic is explained in detail in the following sections).
The advantage of stepping through is that it will allow you to view the simulation process
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step by step (e.g. examination of the sailors preference list), while the auto runs will be
faster in total execution time.
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Figure 9: ABEMS Simulation Specifications
In the preference list generation, the agent will prioritize the sailors' and
commands' preference lists according to the returned sailor utility Us and command
utility Uc' The preference lists are kept in worksheets S_Pl_Pref(Sailors to PI billets),
Pl_SYref (pI billets to sailors), S_P2_Pref (Remaining unmatched sailors to P21P3
billets), and P2_S_Pref(P21P3 billets to remaining sailors). Figure 10 shows that billet 9
offers the highest utility to sailor I (highest possible value of 5), followed by billet 10
with a value of 3.9. Similarly, priority I commands have their preference list of sailors.
The agent then uses the chosen matching logic (sailor or command biased) to find the
best stable matches, while discarding the unstable matches. The matched sailors and
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billets are shown in blue. Thus in the sample shown below, sailor 11 is matched to billet
36. There are no stable matches found for sailor 1, hence he is unmatched. The
unmatched sailors will then be consolidated by the agent for a second round generation of
preference lists and matching logic with priority 2/3 requisition billets. The whole
process is shown in Figure 11.
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Generate list of sailors
(they see only priority 1jobs)
Agent creates sailors' preference list
based on
U =BPlap LaSPL BSaBS
s
where
Us =utility of sailor
BPlaP = return on promotion prospects
Lcd = return on location
BSaBS = return on shore billet
Sumofa = 1
I
Larger lists of sailors and jobs in commands corresponds to lon~~r intervals
between matches. This will investigate if there is aneed for acntlcal mass,
and the possible benefits of having alarger employment market through
consolidation.
Generate list of priority 1 and 2jobs in
commands (expose only priority 1jobs
first)
Agent filters for matching rate
between billets and sailors
(BR=SR)
I
Agent creates commands' preference
list based on
U=Tum SPIIlSPI PCS IlPCS
c
where
U =utility of command
c ..TLIlTL = return on matched training
level
SPI PSPI = return on performance rating
PCS IlPCS =return on lower PCS costs
Sum of p=1
I
Agent runs matching algorithm
to create optimal solutions:
shortlists
I
Agent creates sailors' shortlist
I
Optimal solutions based on:
a) Sailor preference (max UJ
b) Command preference (max Ucl
c) Balanced priority (max Ut) - not
modeled




p=0corresponds to command bias
p= 1corresponds to sailor bias
o< 13 < 1corresponds to some balance of
command and sailor biases
This investigates how the matching might
change according to the preference and
priority of USN.




Agent filters for matching rate
between billets and sailors
(BR= SR)
I
~ r END 1
Agent creates sailors' preference list
based on
I
Agent creates sailors' shortlist
I
Agent runs matching algorithm













Optimal solutions based on:
a) Sailor preference (max UJ
b) Command preference (max Uc)
c) Balanced priority (max Ut) - not
modeled
where Ut ={ ~ Us + ( 1- ~) Uc}
and 0~ ~ ~ 1
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Value of ~ to be consistent to priority 1job
matching for each run of the simulation.
3. ABEMS Output
After a successful simulation run, ABEMS will output the results of the
simulation in the main worksheet. The output primarily comprises the quality and
quantity of the matching. Quality is captured by the average utility of the sailors, priority
1 and priority 2/3 commands. Quantity is captured by the percentage matched for the
sailors, priority I and priority 2/3 commands. The detailed matching of individual sailors
to individual billets are captured in their respective preference worksheets (denoted by
blue). By varying the number of sailors, priority 1 and 2/3 billets, we can examine the
effect of having longer intervals between matching. By varying the preference lengths,
we can examine the effect of having a longer preference to the matching logic. We can
even vary both at the same time to examine their combined effects and to find various
optimal conditions for the two-sided matching logic. These scenarios and their outcomes
are discussed in detail in Chapter IV.
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Figure 12: ABEMS summary output of Quality and Quantity of Matching
C. PREFERENCE LIST ALGORITHM
The sailor's individual utility is given by the Cobb Douglas utility function:
Where:
Us =Utility of sailor
BPlap = Sailor's derived utility from promotion prospects of billet
LaSPL = Sailor's derived utility from fit between sailor's preferred location and
Billet location SPL and BL
BSaBS = Sailor's derived utility from getting a shore billet
= 1
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Sailor's derived utility from promotion prospects of billet. More demanding and
high profile billets are likely to be more challenging to the sailors, and competent sailors
who pass the test are likely to be noticed and ranked higher. This elevates their chances
for promotion and career advancement. This index is captured by the Billet Promotion
Index (BPI) of each requisition billet, ranging from I to 5 (see table). How much utility a
sailor derives from a billet that is likely to boost his career advancement and promotion
prospects will depend on his weight Up.
Sailor's derived utility from fit between sailor's preferred location and billet
location. Sailors specify their preferred location by the index SPL. The billets specify
their location by the index BL. If there is a match between SPL and BL, the Location
Index L will be assigned the value of 5, otherwise, L will be assigned the value of 1. The
sailor will thus derive a higher level ofutility for a successful location match. How much
utility he derives on the match will depend on how much weight he assigned to location
fit, specified by USPL-
Sailor's derived utility from getting a shore billet.2 A shore billet will have a BS
value of 5, while a sea billet a BS value of 1. How much utility a sailor derives from a
shore billet will depend on his weight U BS•
The agent will first filter out the billets that specify a different rate than the
sailor's, i.e. the index BR and SR must match. Of the remaining billets, the agent will
calculate the Us each billet can provide to each sailor, and rank profile the billets for each
sailor based on decreasing Uc' This is the Sailor's Preference List.
2 In the current process, it is recognized that the Navy has a policy of fixed sea-shore rotation. Hence, it
will be unrealistic to let the sailor have a choice between sea-shore billets. However, in our model for
agent-based matching algorithm, we are proposing that if indeed an efficient matching algorithm can be
established, then the assignment process may not need a fIXed policy ofsea-shore rotation in order for it to
work effectively.
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Table 1: Data Characteristics for Sailors
SailorID Preferred Rate Characteristics of Sailor Preference Weight
Location
SR (used for calculating Command Utility Uc) (used in Cobb Douglas utility function for individualSI
SPL sailors Us - to sum to 1)
for
Location Training Level Performance Promotion Preferred Shore
Index Index Weight Location Weight PreferenceFor sailor Command to SL STL Weight
US) filter SPIPCS cost Cl.p Cl.SPL
Cl.ss
1 to 2000 1;W I: E04 I:W I: Not trained I:Not Sailor's affinity Sailor's affinity Sailor's affinity
2: Moderately promote to high profile, to his preferred for shore2:MW 2:E05 2:MW challenging station's preference
trained 2: Promote
3:S 3:E06 3:S jobs that may location, i.e. fit
3: Trained 3: Must boost his between SPL
4:NE 4: E07 4:NE promote promotability andBL
4: Well trained and career5: E08 & 5: Early advancementE09 5: Well trained promote
with experience
The command's individual utility is given by the Cobb Douglas utility fupction:






= Command's derived utility on getting sailor of the desired
= Command's derived utility on getting a sailor of a higher
rating.
= Command's derived utility on getting a lower PCS cost
~TL + ~SPI + ~pcs = 1
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Command's derived utility on getting sailor of the desired trained level.
Commands want to be assigned a sailor whose training level (STL) matches the
requirement of its billet (BTL). If there is a perfect match between STL and BTL, the
matched TL will be assigned a value of 5. Further deviations between STL and BTL will
yield lower values ofTL as given by the formula
TL = 5 - I BTL - STL 1
Billet's Desired Training Level Sailor's Training Level Matching Training Level
BTL STL TL
3: Trained 3: Trained TL = 5 - IBTL - STL 1
=5-13-31
=5
3: Trained 2: Moderately trained TL=5-13-21
=4
Having determined the value of TL for every eligible sailor for a particular billet,
the agent then calculates the utility derived from a training level match. How much
utility a command derived from training level matching will depend on the command's
weight to training level matching (3n.
Command's derived utility on getting a sailor of a higher performance rating.
Some commands will derive a higher utility from being assigned a sailor with a higher
performance rating than others. The sailor's performance rating ranges from 1 (not
promote) to 5 (early promote). The command's derived utility will depend on how much
weight the command has assigned to (3SPI.
Command's derived utility on getting a lower PCS cost. Budget strapped
commands will desire being assigned a sailor with lower PCS cost than those commands
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whose chief concerns are getting sailors of the right training level and high perfonnance
rating.3 To calculate PCS cost, the agent will use a lookup table comparing the sailor's
current location SL and the billet's location BL. The lookup table will return a value of 1
for highest PCS cost to 5 for lowest PCS cost. How much utility a command derives
from the PCS index will depend on its weight to PCS cost, or ~pcs. The lookup table is
found on the worksheet PIProfiler.
Table 2: Data Characteristics for Command Billets
Billet ID Rate Desired Characteristics of Billet Preference Weight
Trained Level (used for calculating Sailor Utility Us) (used in Cobb Douglas utility function for Commands toBI BR
BTL calculate their Uc - to sum to I)(for
Command
to filter)
Promotion Billet Billet Sea or Training Level Performance PCS Cost
Index Location Shore Weight Index Weight
~pcs
BPI BL BS ~TL ~SPf




affinity to affinity to affinity to PCS
prospects getting sailors getting a high costs
trained
3:S to their desired performance3:E06 1: Low training level, sailor. PCS cost is3: Trained
4:E07 2: Moderate 4:NE i.e. fit between determined
4: Well STL and BTL Linked to STL through a lookup5: E08 & trained 3: Average table between SL
E09 andBL
5: Well 4: High
trained with 5: Excellent
experience
D. SAILOR BIASED MATCHING ALGORITHM
The matching algorithm for both sailor biased or command biased followed in
essence, the basic principle for that discussed in Chapter II. The classical algorithm will
be the matching algorithm used in coding the simulation model for matching between the
3 The use ofPCS costs in the simulation model creates the opportunity for commands to be issued "virtual"
dollars in the future. Recognizing that commands will always want the best trained and performing sailors
to join them, the consumption of these desirable traits, in economic terms, will involve the concept of
opportunity cost, and hence the theory of PPF will be appropriate in the analysis of the utility function
here.
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sailors and different commands. The matching logic is achieved by replacing the males
with sailors becoming available for job assignments and females with billets that are
available in different commands, requisitions. This will result in a sailor biased match,
which indicates that each sailor who was matched cannot possibly find another stable
match with a billet ranked higher in his preference list. The commands however, will
only be matched to a sailor that is ranked lowest in its preference list that resulted in a
stable match. In this matching algorithm, the utility of the sailors are maximized while
utility of the commands are minimized, while still ensuring a stable match. The match
will be optimal for the sailors.
E. COMMAND BIASED MATCHING ALGORITHM
In the command biased matching algorithm, the system of assignment is achieved
by replacing the males with billets at different commands and females with sailors
becoming available for assignment. This will result in a command biased match,
reflecting the current detailing process where detailers try to assign sailors to prioritized
jobs while trying to take into account the sailor's preferences. Similar to the sailor biased
matching algorithm, the commands' utilities are maximized while still ensuring a stable
match occurs. The match will be an optimal match for the commands. This thesis will
design simulation models that reflect these two biases, analyzing the results from the two
algorithms and studying the possible implications they have on the current detailing
process.
F. BALANCED COMMAND AND SAILOR MATCHING ALGORITHM
The classical algorithm yields a sailor or command optimal solution, with the
property that every sailor or command has the best billet or sailor that they can have in
any stable matching. In reality, however, it is rare to achieve the best match for one
interested party (biased party or the proposar) while the other party achieves its worst
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match. The matches are likely to be a compromise between both interested parties.
There are articles proposing the idea of "optimal" matching. In this thesis, the focus is
on showing the effects that a sailor or command biased logic has on the utility of the
interested parties. This litility is used as a pseudo representative for the general morale
and happiness of the enlisted personnel in the US Navy, hence directly affecting the
retention of the enlisted corps. Using a "balanced" matching algorithm to better reflect
reality will require further studies and coding, which is not covered in the scope of this
thesis.
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IV. FINDINGS
A. AGENT-BASED EMPLOYMENT MARKET SIMULATOR (ABEMS)
SCENARIOS
Using the algorithm logic discussed in Chapter III, different scenarios were explored to
evaluate the usefulness of an algorithm-based logic matching system. The evaluation is broadly
categorized into qualitative (utility) and quantitative (% matched) analysis. Qualitative analysis
is referenced to show how the average utility per sailor or command varies as different
parameters vary and their possible implications/applications (whenever relevant) for the detailing
system in the USN. Quantitative analysis is evaluated based on the percentage matched for the
sailors, the priority 1 jobs (PI) and priority 2/3 (P2/3) jobs. While the focus of the thesis is to
study the usefulness of an agent-based matching system in detailing the sailors, the team has, as
far as possible, used terms that are consistent with their usage within the detailing community.
The variables chosen for the simulation were chosen due to their perceived importance in a
matching process between sailors and commands.
Under the current nonns, empirically, about 4600 sailors are available for job assignment
at anyone-requisition cycle, within a 9-month time frame (Short, 2000). This is based on a
constant job rotation rate and current 2-week requisition cycle. From the literature study ofNMP
and the manning levels, the team found that there are only enough sailors primed for posting to
fill 85 to 90% of the total billets tendered for requisition at each matching cycle (Hatch, 2000).
This ratio is used for generation in the different scenarios.
In the design of the model, 2000 random sailor and command profiles were generated to
reflect the differences in weightage an individual sailor or command might place on the different
factors/variables which would affect their utility derived from a proposed match. The team noted
that 45 sailors and 60 billets are the nonn for one detailer in the current 2-week process, and of
the total billets, approximately 15% are priority 1 requisition billets (or approximately 9). This
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sample batch size will form the staring point for the simulation, with the team increasing or
decreasing the sample sizes proportionately to reflect longer or shorter intervals between
matching. It is noted here that the simulated results obtained for a 2-week requisition cycle
would mimic the current process of detailing in the USN, provided the detailers have perfect
information of all the billets and sailors available during the cycle, and that their matching logic
is flawless, i.e. no human error.
The different scenarios evaluated are:
• Scenario 1: Find the optimal intervals between matching, given conditions that
mimic current detailing process. The number of sailors, priority 1 and priority 2/3
requisition billets are proportionately increased to reflect longer intervals between
matching. The preference list lengths are kept constant at 5, which is the current
practiced norm.
• Scenario 2: Find the optimal preference list length (required to be stated by the
sailor and command) in the matching process. The number of sailors, priority 1
and 2/3 billets are kept constant, while the preference list lengths are varied.
• Scenario 3: Find the optimal preference length for increasing intervals in the
requisition cycles. By varying the number of sailors, priority 1 and 2/3 billets, as
well as preference list lengths, the team sought to demonstrate the delicate
relationship between these parameters on the final matching output.
• Scenario 4: Find the effect of increasing proportions ofPl billets in the matching
process. All other parameters are kept constant for this simulation.
• Scenario 5: Study the effects of sailor biased and command biased matching.
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• Scenario 6: Compare and contrast the optimal possible matching outcome for a
2-week and 8-week sample by varying the preference lengths.
B. SCENARIO 1 : FIND THE OPTIMAL INTERVALS BETWEEN MATCHING,
GIVEN CONDITIONS THAT MIMIC CURRENT DETAILING PROCESS
(SAILOR BIASED ALGORITHM)
The current detailing process was mimicked by setting the preference length to 5, number
of sailors available and number of requisitions available to 45 and 60, respectively, for a 2-week
requisition cycle. The proportion of PI requisitions to P2IP3 requisitions are set to 15%:85%.
The simulated results were obtained to determine the quality and quantity of fit between sailors
and requisitions. This process was repeated for different intervals between matching, from 1
week to 6 weeks. The simulated results are reflected in Figures 13 and 14.
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1 week 2 weeks 3 weeks 4 weeks 5 weeks 6 weeks
Intervals (weeks)
Figure 13: Increasing Interval on Average Utilities
From the charts, it was observed that the average quality of matches for all sailors and
PIIP2 requisitions decreases as the interval (requisition cycle) was increased. The quality of
match for PI increases at first, before it started to decrease and seemed to bottom out before
increasing again. This seemed to contradict the general belief of the team, that there could exist a
critical mass for an agent-based matching system that would allow better rates of return (in
utility), suggesting a need for longer requisition interval. If this belief was consistent in the
simulation, the results expected would be a graph that would have shown an increasing average
utility as the intervals were increased, before tapering off, reaching a somewhat plateau, and
perhaps declining average utility to reflect the effects of diminishing returns. It should be noted
that the graphs showed the average utilities over all sailorslbillets. The overall decline in the
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utilities level reflects the decrease in percentage matched (Figure 14). Ifwe only take utilities of
those matched into consideration (discarding the unmatched sailorslbillets), the average utilities
of those matched would increase.
It should be noted that subsequent simulations (Scenario 2 and 6) showed that while the
quality and match depends on the interval (requisition cycle), it was equally dependent on the
preference list length given. Comparing between Scenario 1 and 6 would showed that average
utilities were higher for a 8-week cycle, suggesting that there indeed could be a critical mass to
realize maximum average utility. A full study to determine the optimal interval would require
firstly, determining the optimal preference length for each unique interval through simulation;
followed by running the simulations for the different intervals at their optimal length to
determine the optimal period. It was beyond the scope of this thesis to perform these
simulations, given the limitations of software availability and time constraints. However, the
team understands that commercial simulation software, such as Arena would be able to
incorporate the logic programmed for this thesis and performs the desired simulations. This
presented the opportunity for future study.
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Figure 14: Increasing Interval on Percentage Matched (Sailor Biased Algorithm)
The percentage of PI and P2/P3 requisitions matched to a sailor followed the same
general decline as the interval between matches increased. A similar observation was made for
the total percentage of sailors matched as for average utility. Given a preference length of 5, this
trend is expected since it would become increasingly difficult for the algorithm to match sailors
to requisitions. The number of preferences stated are the limiting factor, as the same perceived
favorable jobs are popular amongst most of the sailors and the same perceived good sailors
become the favorite choice for most of the commands, resulting in more "unwanted" jobs and
sailors who were not even rated in the preference list for the algorithm to consider.
Based on Figures 13 & 14 alone, a general observation could be made. Given that the
conditions for the simulation mimicked the current detailing process, 2 weeks requisition cycle
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seemed reasonable for quality and quantity matches. A big assumption here, of course, is that
the preference list length is set to 5. As the pool of participants get larger, maintaining the
preference list length at 5 will severely increase the chance of a "no match" where Sailor X
prefers billet A but finds that billet A does not even list Sailor X in its preference list. The
presence of such a scenario actually validates the simulation package, as it is highly likely that
many sailors will be competing for the best billets, while the commands will be competing for
the best sailors. A short preference list means that almost every sailor is choosing a narrow range
of good billets, to the exclusion of all others - hence the poorer matching for longer intervals with
preference lengths fixed at 5.
C. SCENARIO 2: FIND THE OPTIMAL PREFERENCE LENGTH IN THE
MATCHING PROCESS (SAILOR BIASED ALGORITHM)
Scenario 1 'demonstrated that the quality of match depends on both the interval and preference
list length specified for the simulation. In Scenario 2, the focus was to determine. if there was
any optimal preference length for the matching algorithm in a 2 week interval. In this scenario,
the conditions that mimicked the current matching process were set to constant, varying only the
preference list length. The graphical results are depicted in Figures 15 & 16.
57















Figure 15: Increasing Preference Length on Average Utilities (Sailor Biased Algorithm)
The results showed that the preference lengths had a significant influence on the quality
of the match. For PI requisitions, the average utilities for the command and sailors matched in
this category rose to a maximum as the preference length was increased from I to 3, remaining
constant thereafter for other increases in the preference length. Similar observations for average
utilities were made for the sailors and commands in P2/P3 categories, reaching a maximum when
the preference length was increased to 9.
From more re-runs of the simulated scenario, it was noted that the smallest number of
requisitions or sailors in each category drive the minimum preference length required before
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diminishing returns set in. For example, in the category for PI, the minimum number of
preference length required before diminishing returns varied in tandem with the number
requisitions, as long as the number of requisitions were smaller than the number of sailors
available for matching in this category.
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Figure 16: Increasing Preference Lengths on Percentage Matched (Sailor Biased Algorithm)
Similar observations were made when the quantity of matches in each category were
plotted against increasing preference length. For sailors and PI commands, the minimum
preference list length appears to be 3, and 9 for P2 commands.
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D. SCENARIO 3: DEMONSTRATE THE EFFECT ON MATCHING WITH
INCREASING INTERVALS AND PREFERNCE LENGHTS (SAILOR BIASED
ALGORITHM)
In scenario 3, the focus was to demonstrate the effect of changing both the matching
intervals and preference list length, on the resulting match. From scenario 1, it was noted that the
average utilities and percentage matched decreased as the interval was increased, while keeping
the preference length at 5. As the interval increases, keeping preference length fixed at 5 means
that more sailors and requisitions became "unwanted" as the same favorite jobs/sailors became
the predominant feature in most preference lists. Undesirable jobs and sailors are left out from
the lists. Total average utilities and percentage matched therefore, showed a general decline.
From scenario 2, it was observed that for a given batch size (interval), there exists a minimum
length for the preference list, below which many sailors and billets remain unmatched but
beyond which the utilities and percentage matched do not increase significantly. This minimum
is driven by the smallest number of sailors or requisitions in each category.
In this scenario, both intervals and preference lengths were increased simultaneously to
see the combined effects on matching. The preference list length was chosen to keep percentage
matched relatively constant. The preference list length are shown in parenthesis in Figure 17.
The charted results are shown.
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Figure 17: Increasing Interval on Average Utilities
From these results, it appears that the percentage matched can be maintained at about the
same level as the matching interval increases, by increasing the preference list lengths
correspondingly. This meant that requisition cycle can be increased with no detrimental effect
on the quantity matched. The only constraint is the need for longer preference lengths and it may
be impracticable for the sailor or the command to specify a list longer than 5. Further work is
needed to design a preprocess which would assist the sailor and command in shortlisting their
preferences, based on their input of pertinent characteristics for the jobs/sailors they desire.
Similar in concept to search engines on the web, such as Yahoo! Search, this preprocess would
search out and rank order the preference list for the sailor or command after they key in their
relative importance for different characteristics. The sailor and command would then only be
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required to change the order of the list if they had any disagreement. This is also a task well
suited for performance by intelligent agents (Gates and Nissen, 2001). This will make
implementing a longer requisition cycle feasible.
E. SCENARIO 4: FIND THE EFFECTS ON MATCHING OF INCREASING
PROPORTIONS OF PI REQUISITIONS (SAILOR BIASED ALGORITHM)
In scenario 4, the proportion of PI billets was increased. This is to demonstrate what
might happen should we fall into the tendency of wanting to please commands by placing too
many billets as priority 1 instead of maintaining the current 10 to 15% of the total requisition
billets as priority 1. The results are charted in Figure 18.
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Figure 18: Increasing Proportion of P I Requisition Billets on Percentage Matched
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From the chart, it was noted that the percentage matched for PI requisitions remained at
100% percent matched until the proportion of PI requisitions grew beyond 20%. Beyond 20%,
the quantity matched began to decline. Similar observations were noted for several other
scenarios with different matching intervals, but at constant preference length of 5. The
implication of this simulated results showed that an overzealous classification of billets into the
PI category is counterproductive. It will work against the very reason why different priority
requisitions were created originally.
It was also observed that in general, the total percentage matched for the sailor population
increased to a maximum as the proportion of PI increases to about 50% before declining. This is
consistent with general expectations since at 50% PI proportion, there would be no
differentiation between PI and P2/P3 in the requisitions available for matching, hence the
algorithm is expected to deliver the best match it can delivers by quantity (percentage matched).
This observation was consistent with trial runs using different intervals.
The results above were obtained by setting the preference length at 5. Noting the
potential influence of preference list length on the quality and quantity of matches, it was
hypothesized that if the optimal preference length were used for each desired interval, the
maximum proportion of PI requisitions before deviation from 100% matched could be obtained.
In this scenario, the preference length was close to the optimal preference length of 5 for a 2-
week matching interval, thus 20%:80% ratio (or less) seemed to be the reasonable cut-off point
for 100% matching for PI requisitions.
F. SCENARIO 5: STUDY THE DIFFERENT EFFECTS ON MATCHING
BETWEEN SAILOR AND COMMAND BIASED ALGORITHM
In scenario 5, the sailors and requisitions were matched in similar manner as scenario 1,
replacing the sailor-biased algorithm with the command based algorithm.
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Figure 19: Increasing Intervals on Average Utilities (Command Biased Algorithm)
The results obtained showed that the average utility for the PI commands were similar to
the results in scenario 1. This result was expected since the PI requisitions were matched
hundred percent in both scenarios and the PI billets were able to choose between all available
sailors, so the utility is expected to be about the same. A slight but noticeable overall increase in
utility is observed for commands in the P21P3 category. This difference was probably due to the
command-biased algorithm. The matching algorithm probably had more choices in deciding
which sailors to fill the requisitions, and matched with the aim so that the commands got the
highest sailors on their preference list. This result is consistent with the observed overall decline
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in total average utility for the sailor when the command-biased algorithm was used to produce
the match.
The percentage of match, however, was only affected minimally. There was no
significant trend to be observed between the two scenarios. The utility function used for the
simulation was based on a Cobb-Douglas model, and hence differences in utility were not
expected to be large. This could explain the small differences in results observed. The use of a
utility function that resembles the wide ranging tastes in sailors and commands might result in
more pronounced differences.
G. SCENARIO 6: COMPARE AND CONTRAST THE OPTIMAL MATCHING
OUTCOME POSSIBLE BETWEEN 2-WEEK AND 8-WEEK REQUISITION
CYCLE, BY INCREASING THE PREFERENCE LENGTH (SAILOR BIASED
ALGORITHM)
Scenario 1 and 2 demonstrated that both the intervals and preference lengths influenced
the quality and quantity of matches from the algorithm. In this scenario, the focus was to
...
determine the optimal preference list length for a 8-week interval, making comparisons with the
results obtained for a 2-week interval. The results are shown in Figure 20.
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Figure 20: Comparison ofOptimal Matching Quality Achievable for 8-week & 2-week Sample
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From the graphs, it was noted that the utility for commands in the PI category tapered off
at about preference list length of 14/15. In the 2-week interval, the preference list length was
three. The utility for the commands in P2/P3 category and the average utility for every sailor
tapered off at around 33. In the 2-week interval, the tapering off occurred at about nine. It was
observed that the optimal preference list length for a given interval seemed to vary
proportionately. When the interval was increased by a multiple of 4, the preference list length
was observed to increase by a multiple of4 correspondingly.
Comparing the graphs in Figure 20, it was noted that generally, the optimal average
utilities for the sailors and commands were higher for the 8-week interval, compared to the 2-
week interval. However, a correspondingly higher preference list number is required for the 8-
week sample to attain the higher returns compared to the 2-week sample. Similarly, the team
observed a higher percentage matching for the 8-week sample at their optimal point compared to
the 2-week sample. Again, this only occurs if preference list lengths are higher for the 8-week
sample.
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Figure 21: Comparison of Optimal Matching Quantity Between 8-week and 2-week Sample
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This observation has significant implication since it means economies of scale can be
reaped for larger intervals, provided the optimal preference list length is used. The caveat,
however, is the need for the commands and sailors to specify the lengthy preference list which
might prove impractical. Furthermore, each sailor would need to weigh their preferences for 240
or more billets, compared to just 60 for a normal 2-week cycle. The commands/detailers would
also need to sift through many more sailors than for a 2-week sample. Therefore, some sort of a
decision support preprocess (such as that mentioned in scenario 3), using an intelligent web-
based agent would be required to reap the benefits of scale. As suggested by the simulation runs,
the potential benefits, in both quality and quantity of matching by using longer intervals could be
rather significant, thus justifying the need for more studies.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
A web-based detailing system is an essential tool for the future. The explosion of
technology and the arrival of generation Y sailors who are technology savvy means that the
current way of detailing would have to be improved to maintain an efficient and effective
detailing system for the Navy. Otherwise, in the face oftechnology, the current system would be
left behind and risk being labeled obsolete.
This thesis is an important building block of a bigger initiative aimed at serving the Navy
with a relevant, efficient and effective detailing system for the future. Through the use of
simulations, the team has demonstrated that USN could potentially reap higher quality and
quantity of matching by having longer intervals between matching. This is logical; when the
pool gets larger, it should be possible to find better matches among the participants using the
two-sided matching logic. However, the larger pool must also have longer preference lists to
reap the economies of scale. Otherwise, many sailors may list only a narrow selection of the
same choice billets, and many commands will only list a narrow selection of the few choice
sailors. This will result in a "low match" scenario, and the quality and quantity of the matches
will degrade with increasing intervals.
Along with longer intervals and preference lengths, the team found that the information
individual sailors and commands/detailers must process is tremendous. Thus, there is strong
justification for a web-based intelligent agent. Individual sailors could specify their
characteristics and preferences to the agent, and the agent could process, filter and rank order the
choice list of billets for that individual sailor. The sailor could then further refine his list or play
with different scenarios. Commands and detailers could similarly benefit from such an agent
system.
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS TO DOD I SUGGESTED FURTHER STUDIES
While ABEMS has demonstrated potential areas from which USN could reap benefits in
their detailing process, further research is required. Most significant would be the using actual
sailor and billet data in the process to better predict matching outcomes. The use of possible
"incentives" in the form of bonus dollars should also be examined to make the more onerous
billets more desirable to sailors. This could even expand to the use of gaming theory where
bonus dollars attached to billets could be bided upon and dynamically adjusted according to
market forces.
In Chapter III, it was mentioned that this thesis focused on the effects on interested
parties' utilities resulting from a sailor or command biased logic. In reality, it is very likely that
the match occurs between these two biases. Hence a "balanced" matching algorithm to better
reflect reality will require further studies and possibly extra coding to improve this simulation
model.
In Scenario 1 findings, we noted that that the determination of the optimal interval
required obtaining the optimal preference list length for each unique interval through simulations
before running more simulations to finally obtain the optimal interval. The use of commercial
simulation software allows future study to be conducted for this purpose.
This thesis demonstrated the potential benefits that can be reaped from a agent-based
matching system for the Navy. The results revealed the tip of the ice-berg: the quality and
quantity of matches can improve with electronic matching. Further in depth studies however,
should be conducted to determine scientifically, the variables that should be included in the
simulation program and the relative weight each factor contributes to the sailor's and commands'
utility. This will add realism and credibility to the simulation program for comparison with real
data input from today's process.
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APPENDIXA. TABLES OF RESULTS FROM SCENARIO 1-6
Scenario 1
Type of matching biasness Sailor Sailor Sailor Sailor Sailor Sailor
Preference list length 5 5 5 5 5 5
1 week 2 weeks 3 weeks 4 weeks 5 weeks 6 weeks
ota num er 0 sal ors 23 45 68 90 113 135
No of sailors matched 5 9 14 16 19 25
% of sailors matched to Pi billets 21.74% 20.00% 20.59% 17.78% 16.81% 18.52%
Total utility of matched sailors 14.4054 23.6423 33.8930 40.4706 49.7271 67.3856
Average utility per sailor 0.6263 0.5254 0.4984 0.4497 0.4401 0.4992
Total number of P1' billets 5 9 14 18 23 27
No of Pi billets matched 5 9 14 16 19 25
% of Pi billets matched 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 88.89% 82.61% 92.59%
Total utility of matched commands 17.8928 34.6774 55.0437 61.7142 73.6243 98.0313
Average utility of Pi command 3.5786 3.8530 3.9317 3.4286 3.2011 3.6308
"'; remaining sailors 18 36 54 74 94 110
No of sailors matched to P2 billets 14 24 31 40 37 36
% or remaining sailors matched 77.78% 66.67% 57.41% 54.05% 39.36% 32.73%
Total utility of matched sailors 49.6272 88.7141 116.4915 160.1194 160.4167 160.0499
Average utility per remaining sailor 2.7571 2.4643 2.1573 2.1638 1.7066 1.4550
Total number of P2/P3 billets 25 51 77 102 128 153
No of P2 billets matched 14 24 31 40 37 36
% of P2IP3 billets matched 56.00% 47.06% 40.26% 39.22% 28.91% 23.53%
Total utility of matched commands 49.5167 89.8517 115.9128 157.2701 150.1207 148.1747
Average utility of P2IP3 command 1.9807 1.7618 1.5054 1.5419 1.1728 0.9685
Total Average Utility of Sailors 2.7840 2.4968 2.2115 2.2288 1.8597 1.6847
Total % sailor Matched 82.61% 73.33% 66.18% 62.22% 49.56% 45.19%
71
Scenario 2
Type of matching biasness Sailor Sailor Sailor Sailor Sailor Sailor Sailor Sailor Sailor Sailor Sailor
Preference list length , 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 20
Ii!!!I number 01 saliors 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45
No of sailors matched 4 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
% of sailors matched to P1 8.89% 17.78% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00%
Total utility of matched sailors 11.0163 21,3065 23,6423 23.6423 23,6423 23.6423 23.6423 23.6423 23.6423 23.6423 23.6423
Average utility per sailor 0.2448 0.4735 0.5254 0.5254 0.5254 0.5254 0.5254 0.5254 0.5254 0.5254 0.5254
Total number of P1 billets 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
No of P1 billets matched 4 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
% of P1 billets matched 44.44% 88.89% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total utility of matched commands 15.1284 30.6482 34.6774 34.6774 34.6774 34.6774 34.6774 34.6774 34.6774 34.6774 34.6774
Average utility of Pl command 1.6809 3.4054 3.8530 3.8530 3.8530 3.8530 3.8530 3.8530 3.8530 3.8530 3.8530
to 01 remaining sailors 41 37 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36
No of sailors matched to P2 billets 6 11 16 24 24 25 28 27 31 32 32
% of remaining sailors matched 14.63% 29.73% 44.44% 66.67% 66.67% 69.44% 77.78'10 75.00% 86.11% 88.89% 88.89%
Total utility of matched sailors 25.9638 42.2442 60.1982 89.5577 88.7141 93.2451 103.7262 99.9243 115.4895 118.1076 118.1076
Average utility per remaining sailor 0.6333 1.1417 1.6722 2.4877 2.4643 2.5901 2.8813 2.7757 3.2080 3.2808 3.2808
Total number of P21P3 billets 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51
No of P21P3 billets matched 6 11 16 24 24 25 28 27 31 32 32
% of P2IP3'billets matched 11.76'10 21.57% 31.37% 47.06% 47.06% 49.02% 54.90% 52.94% 60.78% 62.75% 62.75%
Total utility of matched commands 23.2075 37.2387 54.9174 89.2330 89.8517 92.6996 98.0389 94.9038 108.5811 113.3851 113.4981
Average utility of P2IP3 commands 0.4550 0.7302 1.e768 1.7497 1.7618 1.8176 1.9223 1.8609 2.1290 2.2232 2.2255
Total Average Utliity of Sailors 0.8218 1.4122 1.8631 2.5156 2.4968 2.5975 2.8304 2.7459 3.0918 3.1500 3.1500
Total % Sailor Matched 22.22"A. 42.22% 55.56% 73.33% 73.33% 75.56% 82.22% 80.00% 88.89% 91.11% 91.11'10
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Scenario 3
I . 1 wk (4) 2 wks (5) 3wks (6) 4wks (7) 5wks (8) 6 wks (9)
Total number of saIlors 23 45 68 90 113 135
No of sailors matched to Pi billets 5 9 14 18 23 27
% of sailors matched to Pi billets 21.74% 20.00% 20.59% 20.00% 20.35% 20.00%
Total utility of matched sailors 14.4054 23.6423 33.8930 41.4386 53.3657 63.5438
Average utility per sailors 0.6263 0.5254 0.4984 0.4604 0.4723 0.4707
Total number of P1 billets 5 9 14 18 23 27
No of Pi billets matched 5 9 14 18 23 27
% of Pi billets matched 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total utility of matched commands 17.8928 34.6774 55.0437 67.7779 86.3295 104.6727
Average utility of Pi commands 3.5786 3.8530 3.9317 3.7654 3.7535 3.8768
!I! remaining sailors 18 36 54 72 90 108
No of sailors matched to P2IP3 billets 11 24 36 48 59 73
% of remaining sailors matched 61.11% 66.67% 66.67% 66.67% 65.56% 67.59%
Total utility of matched sailors 39.2482 88.7141 136.4093 187.4535 238.6823 295.5469
Average utility per remaining sailors 2.1805 2.4643 2.5261 2.6035 2.6520 2.7365
Total number of P2/P3 billets 25 51 77 102 128 153
No of P2IP3 billets matched 11 24 36 48 59 73
% of P2IP3 billets matched 44.00% 47.06% 46.75% 47.06% 46.09% 47.71%
Total utility of matched commands 42.2819 89.8517 133.6207 187.7974 232.2339 287.0601
Average utility of P2IP3 commands 1.6913 1.7618 1.7353 1.8412 1.8143 1.8762
Total Average Utility of Sailors 2.3328 2.4968 2.5044 2.5432 2.5845 2.6599
Total % Sailor Matched 69.57% 73.33% 73.53% 73.33% 72.57% 74.07%
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Scenario 4
Type of matching biasness Sailor Sailor Sailor Sailor Sailor Sailor Sailor Sailor Sailor Sailor Sailor
Preference list length 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
% P1 billets to Total Billets 5% 10'h 1SOh 20'.4 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50% 55%
45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45
No of sailors matched to P1 billets 3 6 9 12 14 16 19 20 22 23 23
% of sailors matched to P1 billets 6.67% 13.33% 20.00% 26.67".4 31.11% 35.56% 42.22% 44.44% 48.89% 51.11% 51.11%
Total utility of matched sailors 8.2629 16.2110 23.6423 31.3302 36.0866 41.2227 48.0668 64.4837 63.1475 72.8372 74.4348
Average utility per sailors 0.1836 0.3602 0.5254 0.6962 0.8019 0.9161 1.0682 1.2103 1.4033 1.6186 1.6541
Tolal number of P1 billets 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33
No of P1 billets matched 3 6 9 12 14 16 19 20 22 23 23
% of P1 billets matched 100.00% 100.00'.4 100.00% 100.00'.4 93.33% 88.89% 90.48% 83.33% 81.48% 76.67% 69.70'10
Total utility of matched commands 11.7764 21.8188 34.6774 46.2593 53.9435 59.9274 70.6086 76.2567 83.7639 86.1148 87.3899
Average utility of P1 commands 3.9255 3.6365 3.8530 3.8549 3.5962 3.3293 3.3623 3.1774 3.1024 2.8705 2.6482
II!; remaining sadors 42 39 38 33 31 29 26 25 23 22 22
No of sailors matched to P21P3 billets 29 24 24 24 23 22 19 19 18 16 14
% of remaining sailors matched 69.05% 61.54% 66.67% 72.73% 74.19% 75.86% 73.08% 76.00% 78.26".4 72.73% 63.64%
Total utility of matched sailors 98.1536 86.9177 88.7141 88.5673 83.1835 79.1640 88.0172 63.2174 61.8455 56.6733 48.8274
Average utility per remaining sailor 2.3370 2.2799 2.4643 2.6239 2.6833 2.7294 2.6160 2.5287 2.6889 2.5761 2.2194
Total number of P21P3 billets 57 54 51 48 45 42 39 36 33 30 27
No of P21P3 billets matched 29 24 24 24 23 22 19 19 18 16 14
% of P2IP3 billets matched 50.88% 44.44% 47.06% 50.00'10 51.11% 52.38% 48.72% 52.78% 54.55% 53.33% 51.85%
Total utility of matched commands 110.4233 89.1729 89.8517 90.7015 81.2993 81.4050 86.8496 65.9981 63.5824 54.0751 48.9870
Average utility of P2IP3 commands 1.9373 1.6513 1.7618 1.8896 1.8067 1.9382 1.7141 1.8333 1.9267 1.8025 1.8143
Total Average UtIlity of Sailors 2.3648 2.3362 2.4968 2.6204 2.6504 2.6750 2.5796 2.6151 2.7776 2.8780 2.7392
Total % Sailor Matched 71.11% 66.67"10 73.33% 80.00% 82.22% 84.44% 84.44% 86.67% 88.89% 86.67% 82.22%
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Scenario 5
!!!fmatching blasness Coma Coma comd comd comd comd
Preference list length 5 5 5 5 5 5
Total number of sailors
1 week 2 weeks 3 weeks 4 weeks 5 weeks 6 weeks
23 45 68 90 113 135
No of sailors matched to P1 billets 5 9 14 16 19 25
% of sailors matched to P1 billets 21.74% 20.00% 20.59% 17.78% 16.81% 18.52%
Total utility of matched sailors 14.4054 23.6423 33.8930 40.4706 49.7271 67.3856
Average utility per sailors 0.6263 0.5254 0.4984 0.4497 0.4401 0.4992
Total number of P1 billets 5 9 14 18 23 27
No of P1 billets matched 5 9 14 16 19 25
% of P1 billets matched 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 88.89% 82.61% 92.59%
Total utility of matched commands 17.8928 34.6774 55.0437 61.7142 73.6243 98.0313
Average utility of P1 commands 3.5786 3.8530 3.9317 3.4286 3.2011 3.6308
II!J remaining sailors 18 36 54 74 94 110
No of sailors matched to P2IP3 billets 14 23 29 39 34 35
% of remaining sailors matched 77.78% 63.89% 53.70% 52.70% 36.17% 31.82%
Total utility of matched sailors 47.6515 87.7141 111.7284 157.0926 151.0198 158.1175
Average utility per remaining sailors 2.6473 2.4365 2.0690 2.1229 1.6066 1.4374
Total number of P2/P3 billets 25 51 77 102 128 153
No of P2IP3 billets matched 14 23 29 39 34 35
% of P2IP3 billets matched 56.00% 45.10% 37.66% 38.24% 26.56% 22.88%
Total utility of matched commands 52.1438 85.9343 109.6569 152.9523 138.5339 143.2279
Average utility of P2IP3 commands 2.0858 1.6850 1.4241 1.4995 1.0823 0.9361
Total Average Utility of Sailors 2.6981 2.4746 2.1415 2.1951 1.7765 1.6704
Total % Sailor Matched 82.61% 71.11% 63.24% 61.11% 46.90% 44.44%
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